On Rationality in Engineering DesignSource: Journal of Mechanical Design:;2004:;volume( 126 ):;issue: 006::page 945DOI: 10.1115/1.1803850Publisher: The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Abstract: Rationality has different meanings within different contexts. In engineering design, to be rational usually means to be instrumentally rational, that is, to take a measured decision aimed at the realization of a particular goal, as in attempts to optimize an objective function. But in many engineering design problems, especially those that involve several engineers collaborating on a design task, there is no obvious or uncontested, unique objective function. An alternative approach then takes the locus of optimization to be individual engineers’ utility functions. In this paper, we address an argument which claimed that unless the engineers hold a common utility function over design alternatives, a suboptimal, hence, irrational, design is bound to ensue. We challenge this claim and show that, while sticking to the utility-function approach but adopting a game-theoretic perspective, rational outcomes to the problem at issue are possible.
keyword(s): Engineering design , Design , Performance AND Decision making ,
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contributor author | Maarten Franssen | |
contributor author | Universitair Docent | |
contributor author | Louis L. Bucciarelli | |
date accessioned | 2017-05-09T00:13:44Z | |
date available | 2017-05-09T00:13:44Z | |
date copyright | November, 2004 | |
date issued | 2004 | |
identifier issn | 1050-0472 | |
identifier other | JMDEDB-27795#945_1.pdf | |
identifier uri | http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/130438 | |
description abstract | Rationality has different meanings within different contexts. In engineering design, to be rational usually means to be instrumentally rational, that is, to take a measured decision aimed at the realization of a particular goal, as in attempts to optimize an objective function. But in many engineering design problems, especially those that involve several engineers collaborating on a design task, there is no obvious or uncontested, unique objective function. An alternative approach then takes the locus of optimization to be individual engineers’ utility functions. In this paper, we address an argument which claimed that unless the engineers hold a common utility function over design alternatives, a suboptimal, hence, irrational, design is bound to ensue. We challenge this claim and show that, while sticking to the utility-function approach but adopting a game-theoretic perspective, rational outcomes to the problem at issue are possible. | |
publisher | The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) | |
title | On Rationality in Engineering Design | |
type | Journal Paper | |
journal volume | 126 | |
journal issue | 6 | |
journal title | Journal of Mechanical Design | |
identifier doi | 10.1115/1.1803850 | |
journal fristpage | 945 | |
journal lastpage | 949 | |
identifier eissn | 1528-9001 | |
keywords | Engineering design | |
keywords | Design | |
keywords | Performance AND Decision making | |
tree | Journal of Mechanical Design:;2004:;volume( 126 ):;issue: 006 | |
contenttype | Fulltext |