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    Effects of Security Measures: Deterrent versus Diversion

    Source: Journal of Aerospace Engineering:;2004:;Volume ( 017 ):;issue: 003
    Author:
    Ye-Hwa Chen
    DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)0893-1321(2004)17:3(113)
    Publisher: American Society of Civil Engineers
    Abstract: We consider the effects of increasing or decreasing the security expenditures of possible targets (i.e., the possible victims). The conventional wisdom has been that the higher the security expenditure, the lower the crime rate. We study how the change of security expenditures affects the costs of the targets. The problem is formulated as a game-theoretic setting. Both single-act and multiple-act games will be considered. The results will be compared with the conventional wisdom.
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      Effects of Security Measures: Deterrent versus Diversion

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    https://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/45005
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    contributor authorYe-Hwa Chen
    date accessioned2017-05-08T21:16:10Z
    date available2017-05-08T21:16:10Z
    date copyrightJuly 2004
    date issued2004
    identifier other%28asce%290893-1321%282004%2917%3A3%28113%29.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/45005
    description abstractWe consider the effects of increasing or decreasing the security expenditures of possible targets (i.e., the possible victims). The conventional wisdom has been that the higher the security expenditure, the lower the crime rate. We study how the change of security expenditures affects the costs of the targets. The problem is formulated as a game-theoretic setting. Both single-act and multiple-act games will be considered. The results will be compared with the conventional wisdom.
    publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
    titleEffects of Security Measures: Deterrent versus Diversion
    typeJournal Paper
    journal volume17
    journal issue3
    journal titleJournal of Aerospace Engineering
    identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)0893-1321(2004)17:3(113)
    treeJournal of Aerospace Engineering:;2004:;Volume ( 017 ):;issue: 003
    contenttypeFulltext
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    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
    نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
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