| contributor author | Ye-Hwa Chen | |
| date accessioned | 2017-05-08T21:16:10Z | |
| date available | 2017-05-08T21:16:10Z | |
| date copyright | July 2004 | |
| date issued | 2004 | |
| identifier other | %28asce%290893-1321%282004%2917%3A3%28113%29.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/45005 | |
| description abstract | We consider the effects of increasing or decreasing the security expenditures of possible targets (i.e., the possible victims). The conventional wisdom has been that the higher the security expenditure, the lower the crime rate. We study how the change of security expenditures affects the costs of the targets. The problem is formulated as a game-theoretic setting. Both single-act and multiple-act games will be considered. The results will be compared with the conventional wisdom. | |
| publisher | American Society of Civil Engineers | |
| title | Effects of Security Measures: Deterrent versus Diversion | |
| type | Journal Paper | |
| journal volume | 17 | |
| journal issue | 3 | |
| journal title | Journal of Aerospace Engineering | |
| identifier doi | 10.1061/(ASCE)0893-1321(2004)17:3(113) | |
| tree | Journal of Aerospace Engineering:;2004:;Volume ( 017 ):;issue: 003 | |
| contenttype | Fulltext | |