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contributor authorYe-Hwa Chen
date accessioned2017-05-08T21:16:10Z
date available2017-05-08T21:16:10Z
date copyrightJuly 2004
date issued2004
identifier other%28asce%290893-1321%282004%2917%3A3%28113%29.pdf
identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/45005
description abstractWe consider the effects of increasing or decreasing the security expenditures of possible targets (i.e., the possible victims). The conventional wisdom has been that the higher the security expenditure, the lower the crime rate. We study how the change of security expenditures affects the costs of the targets. The problem is formulated as a game-theoretic setting. Both single-act and multiple-act games will be considered. The results will be compared with the conventional wisdom.
publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
titleEffects of Security Measures: Deterrent versus Diversion
typeJournal Paper
journal volume17
journal issue3
journal titleJournal of Aerospace Engineering
identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)0893-1321(2004)17:3(113)
treeJournal of Aerospace Engineering:;2004:;Volume ( 017 ):;issue: 003
contenttypeFulltext


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