YaBeSH Engineering and Technology Library

    • Journals
    • PaperQuest
    • YSE Standards
    • YaBeSH
    • Login
    View Item 
    •   YE&T Library
    • ASME
    • Journal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control
    • View Item
    •   YE&T Library
    • ASME
    • Journal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control
    • View Item
    • All Fields
    • Source Title
    • Year
    • Publisher
    • Title
    • Subject
    • Author
    • DOI
    • ISBN
    Advanced Search
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Archive

    Autonomous Vehicle-Target Assignment: A Game-Theoretical Formulation

    Source: Journal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control:;2007:;volume( 129 ):;issue: 005::page 584
    Author:
    Gürdal Arslan
    ,
    Jason R. Marden
    ,
    Jeff S. Shamma
    DOI: 10.1115/1.2766722
    Publisher: The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
    Abstract: We consider an autonomous vehicle-target assignment problem where a group of vehicles are expected to optimally assign themselves to a set of targets. We introduce a game-theoretical formulation of the problem in which the vehicles are viewed as self-interested decision makers. Thus, we seek the optimization of a global utility function through autonomous vehicles that are capable of making individually rational decisions to optimize their own utility functions. The first important aspect of the problem is to choose the utility functions of the vehicles in such a way that the objectives of the vehicles are localized to each vehicle yet aligned with a global utility function. The second important aspect of the problem is to equip the vehicles with an appropriate negotiation mechanism by which each vehicle pursues the optimization of its own utility function. We present several design procedures and accompanying caveats for vehicle utility design. We present two new negotiation mechanisms, namely, “generalized regret monitoring with fading memory and inertia” and “selective spatial adaptive play,” and provide accompanying proofs of their convergence. Finally, we present simulations that illustrate how vehicle negotiations can consistently lead to near-optimal assignments provided that the utilities of the vehicles are designed appropriately.
    keyword(s): Vehicles , Public utilities AND Negotiation ,
    • Download: (472.0Kb)
    • Show Full MetaData Hide Full MetaData
    • Get RIS
    • Item Order
    • Go To Publisher
    • Statistics

      Autonomous Vehicle-Target Assignment: A Game-Theoretical Formulation

    URI
    https://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/135428
    Collections
    • Journal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control

    Show full item record

    contributor authorGürdal Arslan
    contributor authorJason R. Marden
    contributor authorJeff S. Shamma
    date accessioned2017-05-09T00:23:07Z
    date available2017-05-09T00:23:07Z
    date copyrightSeptember, 2007
    date issued2007
    identifier issn0022-0434
    identifier otherJDSMAA-26405#584_1.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/135428
    description abstractWe consider an autonomous vehicle-target assignment problem where a group of vehicles are expected to optimally assign themselves to a set of targets. We introduce a game-theoretical formulation of the problem in which the vehicles are viewed as self-interested decision makers. Thus, we seek the optimization of a global utility function through autonomous vehicles that are capable of making individually rational decisions to optimize their own utility functions. The first important aspect of the problem is to choose the utility functions of the vehicles in such a way that the objectives of the vehicles are localized to each vehicle yet aligned with a global utility function. The second important aspect of the problem is to equip the vehicles with an appropriate negotiation mechanism by which each vehicle pursues the optimization of its own utility function. We present several design procedures and accompanying caveats for vehicle utility design. We present two new negotiation mechanisms, namely, “generalized regret monitoring with fading memory and inertia” and “selective spatial adaptive play,” and provide accompanying proofs of their convergence. Finally, we present simulations that illustrate how vehicle negotiations can consistently lead to near-optimal assignments provided that the utilities of the vehicles are designed appropriately.
    publisherThe American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
    titleAutonomous Vehicle-Target Assignment: A Game-Theoretical Formulation
    typeJournal Paper
    journal volume129
    journal issue5
    journal titleJournal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control
    identifier doi10.1115/1.2766722
    journal fristpage584
    journal lastpage596
    identifier eissn1528-9028
    keywordsVehicles
    keywordsPublic utilities AND Negotiation
    treeJournal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control:;2007:;volume( 129 ):;issue: 005
    contenttypeFulltext
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
    نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
    yabeshDSpacePersian
     
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
    نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
    yabeshDSpacePersian