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    Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach

    Source: Journal of Management in Engineering:;2015:;Volume ( 031 ):;issue: 006
    Author:
    Mohamed S. Eid
    ,
    Islam H. El-adaway
    ,
    Kalyn T. Coatney
    DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357
    Publisher: American Society of Civil Engineers
    Abstract: Mitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the
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      Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach

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    http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/80411
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    contributor authorMohamed S. Eid
    contributor authorIslam H. El-adaway
    contributor authorKalyn T. Coatney
    date accessioned2017-05-08T22:25:33Z
    date available2017-05-08T22:25:33Z
    date copyrightNovember 2015
    date issued2015
    identifier other44452356.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/80411
    description abstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the
    publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
    titleEvolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach
    typeJournal Paper
    journal volume31
    journal issue6
    journal titleJournal of Management in Engineering
    identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357
    treeJournal of Management in Engineering:;2015:;Volume ( 031 ):;issue: 006
    contenttypeFulltext
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