Modeling Social Opposition to Infrastructure Development

Abstract

Social and political dynamics increasingly determine the fate of infrastructure development around the world. Decision makers involved with projects such as the Keystone XL pipeline in North America, the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil, and the Bujagali Dam in Uganda have been forced to substantially change their plans as a result of opposition. This study looks at such emergent dynamics to provide a quantitative assessment of risks associated with social sustainability in infrastructure development. An interactional model is proposed to analyze emergent risks in a complex system of systems and it is applied to emergent risks in infrastructure development. The analysis is based on the game-theoretic equilibria for an interaction between two actors, namely, the developer and the opposition. Using simulation the structural and contextual variations were investigated in the context of the project along with consequent emergent patterns of outcomes and associated risk profiles. The model comprises informal and formal interactional stages to investigate the impact of alternative mitigation strategies on project risk. The application of the proposed methodology is showcased in an analysis of informal and formal strategies to deliver socially sustainable projects.