Balancing Public and Private Stakeholder Interests in BOT Concessions: Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Royalty Scheme Applied to a Water Treatment Project in China

Abstract

Because of demand uncertainties, a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project may lead a concessionaire either to realize an excessive profit or suffer a loss. The object of this paper is to establish an adjustment mechanism to automatically balance the risks and rewards between public and private sectors under the fixed preset concession period. Using a revised net present value (NPV) financial evaluation model and the Monte Carlo simulation technique, the authors construct a model that can determine the optimum solution of the minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) level and the collect rate of royalty for BOT projects. The MRG and royalty collection combination (G&R) is shown, via a reduction in the decision variables, to be a more effective scheme than those in previous studies. The results of a sensitivity analysis based on a wastewater treatment BOT project prove that Scheme M of MRG based on 90% volume combined with a 20% royalty rate is the leading option because it guarantees that the concessionaire will always earn a reasonable anticipated return under the fixed term. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a simple tool for balancing the risks and benefits for the government and investors.