Developing Collaborative Driving Mechanism of Prefabricated Buildings Using Multiagent Stochastic Evolutionary GameSource: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management:;2024:;Volume ( 150 ):;issue: 006::page 04024050-1DOI: 10.1061/JCEMD4.COENG-14396Publisher: American Society of Civil Engineers
Abstract: The prefabricated building has been widely promoted in recent years as it can effectively alleviate the conflict between economic growth and environmental resources. However, the development of the prefabricated building has fallen short of anticipated goals under the influence of the dynamic circumstances and behavioral strategies of multiple stakeholders. Understanding the relevant stakeholders’ behavioral strategies and collaborative evolution mechanisms is key to promoting prefabricated buildings’ orderly and efficient development. Therefore, this study combines the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics, introduces Gaussian white noise stochastic disturbance terms to model the complex characteristics of multiagent behavior toward prefabricated buildings, and establishes evolutionary game models and stochastic evolutionary game models for local governments, contractors, and consumers. Subsequently, the influences of strategy choice behavior with or without central government supervision were analyzed to study the collaborative driving mechanism of prefabricated buildings under the multiple effects of the government and market. The findings of this research underscore the necessity for government and market collaboration in championing the sustainable evolution of prefabricated buildings. While central government supervision spurs the growth of these structures, its static reward–punishment approach offers only fleeting collaborative momentum and fails to ensure market steadiness. In contrast, the improved dynamic incentive and disincentive mechanism can effectively control fluctuations in the evolutionary process, which is critical in achieving stable development and collaborative governance toward prefabricated buildings. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by broadening the horizons of evolutionary game theory applications and providing a perspective for understanding the behavioral strategies driving the development of prefabricated buildings by both government and market forces. Therefore, a series of driving mechanisms is proposed, providing theoretical guidance and practical insights to prompt the long-term development of prefabricated buildings more effectively.
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contributor author | Qianqian Shi | |
contributor author | Ziyu Wang | |
contributor author | Jianbo Zhu | |
date accessioned | 2024-12-24T10:21:14Z | |
date available | 2024-12-24T10:21:14Z | |
date copyright | 6/1/2024 12:00:00 AM | |
date issued | 2024 | |
identifier other | JCEMD4.COENG-14396.pdf | |
identifier uri | http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4298763 | |
description abstract | The prefabricated building has been widely promoted in recent years as it can effectively alleviate the conflict between economic growth and environmental resources. However, the development of the prefabricated building has fallen short of anticipated goals under the influence of the dynamic circumstances and behavioral strategies of multiple stakeholders. Understanding the relevant stakeholders’ behavioral strategies and collaborative evolution mechanisms is key to promoting prefabricated buildings’ orderly and efficient development. Therefore, this study combines the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics, introduces Gaussian white noise stochastic disturbance terms to model the complex characteristics of multiagent behavior toward prefabricated buildings, and establishes evolutionary game models and stochastic evolutionary game models for local governments, contractors, and consumers. Subsequently, the influences of strategy choice behavior with or without central government supervision were analyzed to study the collaborative driving mechanism of prefabricated buildings under the multiple effects of the government and market. The findings of this research underscore the necessity for government and market collaboration in championing the sustainable evolution of prefabricated buildings. While central government supervision spurs the growth of these structures, its static reward–punishment approach offers only fleeting collaborative momentum and fails to ensure market steadiness. In contrast, the improved dynamic incentive and disincentive mechanism can effectively control fluctuations in the evolutionary process, which is critical in achieving stable development and collaborative governance toward prefabricated buildings. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by broadening the horizons of evolutionary game theory applications and providing a perspective for understanding the behavioral strategies driving the development of prefabricated buildings by both government and market forces. Therefore, a series of driving mechanisms is proposed, providing theoretical guidance and practical insights to prompt the long-term development of prefabricated buildings more effectively. | |
publisher | American Society of Civil Engineers | |
title | Developing Collaborative Driving Mechanism of Prefabricated Buildings Using Multiagent Stochastic Evolutionary Game | |
type | Journal Article | |
journal volume | 150 | |
journal issue | 6 | |
journal title | Journal of Construction Engineering and Management | |
identifier doi | 10.1061/JCEMD4.COENG-14396 | |
journal fristpage | 04024050-1 | |
journal lastpage | 04024050-18 | |
page | 18 | |
tree | Journal of Construction Engineering and Management:;2024:;Volume ( 150 ):;issue: 006 | |
contenttype | Fulltext |