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    Motivating Reliable Collaboration for Modular Construction: Shapley Value–Based Smart Contract

    Source: Journal of Management in Engineering:;2023:;Volume ( 039 ):;issue: 006::page 04023042-1
    Author:
    Gongfan Chen
    ,
    Min Liu
    ,
    Huaming Li
    ,
    Simon M. Hsiang
    ,
    Ashtad Jarvamard
    DOI: 10.1061/JMENEA.MEENG-5428
    Publisher: ASCE
    Abstract: Establishing a fair benefit distribution system for construction projects, in which participants often need to work together in a highly uncertain and interrelated environment, is challenging. There is a lack of objective mechanism for construction projects to motivate reliable workflow automatically and instantly. The objective of this study is to develop Shapley value–based smart contracts to automatically assign fair rewards/penalties to motivate task-level collaborations. The research first developed a simulation model to quantify subcontractors’ marginal contributions under different coalitional scenarios. Then, the simulation results were aggregated using Shapley value to determine each participant’s reasonable rewards/penalties. Lastly, the payment was encoded in the smart contract and then deployed in the blockchain to self-enforce consensus executions. The results showed that Shapley value–based smart contracts exhibited incentives to motivate reliable contributions and enable peer negotiations to realize task-level production. The contributions of this study to the body of knowledge are (1) quantify subcontractors’ marginal contributions to the project, and (2) determine how to distribute fair collaborative outcomes when project participants can perform at different levels of effort. The incentives embedded in smart contracts can reshape project participants’ collaborative behaviors toward desired outcomes, enabling a self-manage, self-govern, and self-adjust decentralized autonomous organization.
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      Motivating Reliable Collaboration for Modular Construction: Shapley Value–Based Smart Contract

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    contributor authorGongfan Chen
    contributor authorMin Liu
    contributor authorHuaming Li
    contributor authorSimon M. Hsiang
    contributor authorAshtad Jarvamard
    date accessioned2024-04-27T20:53:04Z
    date available2024-04-27T20:53:04Z
    date issued2023/11/01
    identifier other10.1061-JMENEA.MEENG-5428.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4296169
    description abstractEstablishing a fair benefit distribution system for construction projects, in which participants often need to work together in a highly uncertain and interrelated environment, is challenging. There is a lack of objective mechanism for construction projects to motivate reliable workflow automatically and instantly. The objective of this study is to develop Shapley value–based smart contracts to automatically assign fair rewards/penalties to motivate task-level collaborations. The research first developed a simulation model to quantify subcontractors’ marginal contributions under different coalitional scenarios. Then, the simulation results were aggregated using Shapley value to determine each participant’s reasonable rewards/penalties. Lastly, the payment was encoded in the smart contract and then deployed in the blockchain to self-enforce consensus executions. The results showed that Shapley value–based smart contracts exhibited incentives to motivate reliable contributions and enable peer negotiations to realize task-level production. The contributions of this study to the body of knowledge are (1) quantify subcontractors’ marginal contributions to the project, and (2) determine how to distribute fair collaborative outcomes when project participants can perform at different levels of effort. The incentives embedded in smart contracts can reshape project participants’ collaborative behaviors toward desired outcomes, enabling a self-manage, self-govern, and self-adjust decentralized autonomous organization.
    publisherASCE
    titleMotivating Reliable Collaboration for Modular Construction: Shapley Value–Based Smart Contract
    typeJournal Article
    journal volume39
    journal issue6
    journal titleJournal of Management in Engineering
    identifier doi10.1061/JMENEA.MEENG-5428
    journal fristpage04023042-1
    journal lastpage04023042-15
    page15
    treeJournal of Management in Engineering:;2023:;Volume ( 039 ):;issue: 006
    contenttypeFulltext
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