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    OPTID: Optimal Incentives and Disincentives

    Source: Journal of Management in Engineering:;2021:;Volume ( 037 ):;issue: 005::page 04021054-1
    Author:
    Kunhee Choi
    ,
    Junseo Bae
    ,
    Young Hoon Kwak
    DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000946
    Publisher: ASCE
    Abstract: Contracting agencies must be able to offer incentive/disincentive (I/D) rates greater than the builder’s added cost (BAC) of acceleration. Doing so encourages qualified contractors to bid on projects. Most agencies determine I/D amounts either by road user cost (RUC) or as a percentage of the total project cost. Estimating I/D rates that will motivate the expedited delivery of projects, exceed BAC, and remain below the overall monetary savings realized by the contracting agency is an exceedingly daunting task. To overcome this pressing practical challenge, this study developed and validated a novel decision support system that estimates optimized I/D (OPTID) rates. The OPTID model integrates the project duration estimate, contractor’s additional cost commitment, and RUC. An optimal I/D rate is then estimated via a systematic seven-step method. The practicality of OPTID was tested using a real-world highway rehabilitation project. The proposed OPTID model will provide local agencies with the first integrated tool that can be used to establish optimal I/D amounts. This research will help decision makers and planners make the most well-informed decisions when utilizing I/D contracting provisions.
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      OPTID: Optimal Incentives and Disincentives

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    http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4272456
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    contributor authorKunhee Choi
    contributor authorJunseo Bae
    contributor authorYoung Hoon Kwak
    date accessioned2022-02-01T22:00:37Z
    date available2022-02-01T22:00:37Z
    date issued9/1/2021
    identifier other%28ASCE%29ME.1943-5479.0000946.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4272456
    description abstractContracting agencies must be able to offer incentive/disincentive (I/D) rates greater than the builder’s added cost (BAC) of acceleration. Doing so encourages qualified contractors to bid on projects. Most agencies determine I/D amounts either by road user cost (RUC) or as a percentage of the total project cost. Estimating I/D rates that will motivate the expedited delivery of projects, exceed BAC, and remain below the overall monetary savings realized by the contracting agency is an exceedingly daunting task. To overcome this pressing practical challenge, this study developed and validated a novel decision support system that estimates optimized I/D (OPTID) rates. The OPTID model integrates the project duration estimate, contractor’s additional cost commitment, and RUC. An optimal I/D rate is then estimated via a systematic seven-step method. The practicality of OPTID was tested using a real-world highway rehabilitation project. The proposed OPTID model will provide local agencies with the first integrated tool that can be used to establish optimal I/D amounts. This research will help decision makers and planners make the most well-informed decisions when utilizing I/D contracting provisions.
    publisherASCE
    titleOPTID: Optimal Incentives and Disincentives
    typeJournal Paper
    journal volume37
    journal issue5
    journal titleJournal of Management in Engineering
    identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000946
    journal fristpage04021054-1
    journal lastpage04021054-16
    page16
    treeJournal of Management in Engineering:;2021:;Volume ( 037 ):;issue: 005
    contenttypeFulltext
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