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    Game Model of Lane Changing for Bus Exiting at Bus Bay Stops

    Source: Journal of Transportation Engineering, Part A: Systems:;2021:;Volume ( 147 ):;issue: 009::page 04021046-1
    Author:
    Ronghan Yao
    ,
    Xiaojing Du
    ,
    Wensong Zhang
    ,
    He Zhang
    DOI: 10.1061/JTEPBS.0000566
    Publisher: ASCE
    Abstract: To improve public transportation operations, this research investigates the lane-changing behaviors for buses exiting at bus bay stops. Game theory is utilized to analyze the interactions between bus and social vehicle drivers. A two-player noncooperative, non-zero-sum mixed-strategy game model is formulated to consider the time saving and collision avoidance payoffs for both players in the game. The characteristic of mass passengers carried by buses is also taken into account in the payoffs. The maximum likelihood estimation is used to calibrate the formulated model using the vehicle trajectory data collected from Lvboqiao bus bay stop, Dalian, China. The validation results reveal that the formulated model can effectively predict the lane-changing decisions with a high level of accuracy. Besides mixed strategies, the players in the game may have dominant strategies, which are the best choices that have nothing to do with the strategies that other players may adopt. In both mixed and dominant strategies, bus drivers are more inclined to choose the strategy of not changing a lane, and social vehicle drivers tend to choose the strategy of not giving way to the bus. The tendencies to choose strategies by both players are consistent with the actual decisions made by drivers. It is proven that the formulated game model is highly reliable to describe bus drivers’ exiting behaviors at bus bay stops and can offer the decent theoretical support for both players to make better decisions.
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      Game Model of Lane Changing for Bus Exiting at Bus Bay Stops

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    http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4271873
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    • Journal of Transportation Engineering, Part A: Systems

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    contributor authorRonghan Yao
    contributor authorXiaojing Du
    contributor authorWensong Zhang
    contributor authorHe Zhang
    date accessioned2022-02-01T21:42:13Z
    date available2022-02-01T21:42:13Z
    date issued9/1/2021
    identifier otherJTEPBS.0000566.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4271873
    description abstractTo improve public transportation operations, this research investigates the lane-changing behaviors for buses exiting at bus bay stops. Game theory is utilized to analyze the interactions between bus and social vehicle drivers. A two-player noncooperative, non-zero-sum mixed-strategy game model is formulated to consider the time saving and collision avoidance payoffs for both players in the game. The characteristic of mass passengers carried by buses is also taken into account in the payoffs. The maximum likelihood estimation is used to calibrate the formulated model using the vehicle trajectory data collected from Lvboqiao bus bay stop, Dalian, China. The validation results reveal that the formulated model can effectively predict the lane-changing decisions with a high level of accuracy. Besides mixed strategies, the players in the game may have dominant strategies, which are the best choices that have nothing to do with the strategies that other players may adopt. In both mixed and dominant strategies, bus drivers are more inclined to choose the strategy of not changing a lane, and social vehicle drivers tend to choose the strategy of not giving way to the bus. The tendencies to choose strategies by both players are consistent with the actual decisions made by drivers. It is proven that the formulated game model is highly reliable to describe bus drivers’ exiting behaviors at bus bay stops and can offer the decent theoretical support for both players to make better decisions.
    publisherASCE
    titleGame Model of Lane Changing for Bus Exiting at Bus Bay Stops
    typeJournal Paper
    journal volume147
    journal issue9
    journal titleJournal of Transportation Engineering, Part A: Systems
    identifier doi10.1061/JTEPBS.0000566
    journal fristpage04021046-1
    journal lastpage04021046-12
    page12
    treeJournal of Transportation Engineering, Part A: Systems:;2021:;Volume ( 147 ):;issue: 009
    contenttypeFulltext
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