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    Noncompete Provision Design for Transportation PPP Projects

    Source: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management:;2021:;Volume ( 147 ):;issue: 002::page 04020159
    Author:
    Bing Wang
    ,
    Qingbin Cui
    ,
    Shuibo Zhang
    DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001982
    Publisher: ASCE
    Abstract: Projects with poor noncompete provision design have caused heavy costs for both public and private organizations, primarily due to the embedded monopoly right of the private sector to collect toll revenue. Prior studies have investigated the financial impact of including noncompete provisions in public-private partnership (PPP) contracts to ensure project attractiveness to private entities, although the potential impact of such provisions on the public interest has not been well documented. This study contributes to the literature by incorporating social benefits into an evaluation model to balance the protection of public and private interests. Three contract design alternatives—strict noncompete, compensation for competing facilities, and compete without compensation—are evaluated and compared. This study demonstrates these alternatives with the I-77 Express Lane project in North Carolina and provides several insightful results. First, a strict noncompete provision often worsens congestion, negatively affecting the public interest, and should be avoided. Second, both public and private organizations may benefit from inclusion of a compensation provision that eliminates a prospective monopoly while offering compensation for competing facilities. Third, public benefits from competing facilities present a convex curve over time, suggesting optimal timing for the government to build the competing facility. The results illustrate the significant effect of the noncompete provision on the public interest, and provide governments with a reference to balance protection of the public interest and attractiveness to private investors when designing the noncompete provision.
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      Noncompete Provision Design for Transportation PPP Projects

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    contributor authorBing Wang
    contributor authorQingbin Cui
    contributor authorShuibo Zhang
    date accessioned2022-01-30T22:49:49Z
    date available2022-01-30T22:49:49Z
    date issued2/1/2021
    identifier other(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001982.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4269700
    description abstractProjects with poor noncompete provision design have caused heavy costs for both public and private organizations, primarily due to the embedded monopoly right of the private sector to collect toll revenue. Prior studies have investigated the financial impact of including noncompete provisions in public-private partnership (PPP) contracts to ensure project attractiveness to private entities, although the potential impact of such provisions on the public interest has not been well documented. This study contributes to the literature by incorporating social benefits into an evaluation model to balance the protection of public and private interests. Three contract design alternatives—strict noncompete, compensation for competing facilities, and compete without compensation—are evaluated and compared. This study demonstrates these alternatives with the I-77 Express Lane project in North Carolina and provides several insightful results. First, a strict noncompete provision often worsens congestion, negatively affecting the public interest, and should be avoided. Second, both public and private organizations may benefit from inclusion of a compensation provision that eliminates a prospective monopoly while offering compensation for competing facilities. Third, public benefits from competing facilities present a convex curve over time, suggesting optimal timing for the government to build the competing facility. The results illustrate the significant effect of the noncompete provision on the public interest, and provide governments with a reference to balance protection of the public interest and attractiveness to private investors when designing the noncompete provision.
    publisherASCE
    titleNoncompete Provision Design for Transportation PPP Projects
    typeJournal Paper
    journal volume147
    journal issue2
    journal titleJournal of Construction Engineering and Management
    identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001982
    journal fristpage04020159
    journal lastpage04020159-9
    page9
    treeJournal of Construction Engineering and Management:;2021:;Volume ( 147 ):;issue: 002
    contenttypeFulltext
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