Quantifying Failure for Critical Water Infrastructures under Cyber-Physical Threats

Abstract

This paper presents a failure quantification methodology to assess the impact of cyber-physical attacks (CPAs) on critical water infrastructures, such as water distribution networks, by mapping simulation-derived data onto metrics. The approach sets out a three-step profiling architecture to interpret the consequences of failures resulting from CPAs against several dimensions of integrity, adjusted through user-defined service levels. Failure is examined in terms of its magnitude, propagation, severity, and crest factor, while rapidity is used to infer available time slots to react. The methodology is operationalized through a dedicated tool designed to assist water-sector critical infrastructures gauge and assess CPAs. The approach is demonstrated on a benchmark water distribution system, and results and insights from the metrics are presented and discussed. It is argued that the approach and the tool that operationalizes its application can be useful to water companies that need to assess and compare cyber-physical threats and prioritize mitigation actions based on quantitative metrics.