BIM Adoption under Government Subsidy: Technology Diffusion Perspective

Abstract

Although building information modeling (BIM) holds the promise of significantly advancing the architecture, engineering, and construction (AEC) market worldwide, its widespread acceptance and adoption is still an unsolved issue. From a technology diffusion perspective, this paper proposes a game theory–based model including two firms who both are potential BIM adopters under support from the government (i.e., subsidy). Two influential factors affecting AEC firms’ BIM adoption decisions are identified, including BIM adoption efficiency and adoption incentives. Through analyzing the model with a backward-induction method, AEC firms’ best responses of joining time and the government’s optimal subsidizing strategies are discussed. The findings show that the government subsidy is effective in promoting BIM adoption because the subsidy can both bring forward the joining time and enhance BIM adoption efficiency by offsetting firms’ setup costs. Under the government’s subsidy policies, AEC firms that are originally negative toward BIM adoption can become positive, which demonstrates the occurrence of BIM technology diffusion. Theoretical and practice implications are also discussed. This study contributes to a new perspective for understanding BIM adoption behaviors among AEC firms. In addition, the study for the first time introduces game theory into explaining BIM adoption and diffusion, which may benefit BIM implementation and enhance the effectiveness of policies aiming at promoting BIM application practices.