Hedging and the Mode of Expression of Weather ForecastsSource: Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society:;1978:;volume( 059 ):;issue: 004::page 371Author:Murphy, Allan H.
DOI: 10.1175/1520-0477(1978)059<0371:HATMOE>2.0.CO;2Publisher: American Meteorological Society
Abstract: This paper briefly examines the nature of hedging and its role in the formulation of categorical and probabilistic forecasts. Hedging is defined in terms of the difference between a forecaster's judgment and his forecast. It is then argued that a judgment cannot accurately reflect the forecaster's true state of knowledge unless the uncertainties inherent in the formulation of this judgment are described in a qualitative and/or quantitative manner. Since categorical forecasting does not provide the forecaster with a means of making his forecasts correspond to such judgments, a categorical forecast is generally a hedge. Probabilistic forecasting, on the other hand, presents the forecaster with an opportunity to eliminate hedging by making his (probabilistic) forecasts correspond exactly to his judgments. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the desire to eliminate hedging should encourage forecasters to express more rather than fewer forecasts in probabilistic terms.
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contributor author | Murphy, Allan H. | |
date accessioned | 2017-06-09T14:39:40Z | |
date available | 2017-06-09T14:39:40Z | |
date copyright | 1978/04/01 | |
date issued | 1978 | |
identifier issn | 0003-0007 | |
identifier other | ams-23868.pdf | |
identifier uri | http://onlinelibrary.yabesh.ir/handle/yetl/4160476 | |
description abstract | This paper briefly examines the nature of hedging and its role in the formulation of categorical and probabilistic forecasts. Hedging is defined in terms of the difference between a forecaster's judgment and his forecast. It is then argued that a judgment cannot accurately reflect the forecaster's true state of knowledge unless the uncertainties inherent in the formulation of this judgment are described in a qualitative and/or quantitative manner. Since categorical forecasting does not provide the forecaster with a means of making his forecasts correspond to such judgments, a categorical forecast is generally a hedge. Probabilistic forecasting, on the other hand, presents the forecaster with an opportunity to eliminate hedging by making his (probabilistic) forecasts correspond exactly to his judgments. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the desire to eliminate hedging should encourage forecasters to express more rather than fewer forecasts in probabilistic terms. | |
publisher | American Meteorological Society | |
title | Hedging and the Mode of Expression of Weather Forecasts | |
type | Journal Paper | |
journal volume | 59 | |
journal issue | 4 | |
journal title | Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society | |
identifier doi | 10.1175/1520-0477(1978)059<0371:HATMOE>2.0.CO;2 | |
journal fristpage | 371 | |
journal lastpage | 373 | |
tree | Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society:;1978:;volume( 059 ):;issue: 004 | |
contenttype | Fulltext |