Procurement Effects on Coopetition in Client-Contractor Relationships

Abstract

Client-contractor relationships are often criticized for being competitive and adversarial, rather than cooperative. The main purpose of this paper is to examine how construction clients’ procurement procedures affect the balance between cooperation and competition (i.e., coopetition) in client-contractor relationships. The empirical results, based on a survey to 87 Swedish construction clients, show that clients’ procurement procedures facilitate a focus on competition. It was also found that clients’ earlier experience of a certain procedure heavily affects their procurement choices, thereby preserving old behaviors. Although two-thirds of the clients wish to increase cooperation with contractors, this does not affect their procurement decisions. This study therefore concludes that the theoretical framework, based on transaction cost economics, is correct in prescribing more cooperation than is empirically observed in the construction sector. The theoretical framework can increase clients’ awareness of how procurement affects cooperation and competition, thereby serving as a basis for more unbiased and systematic procurement decisions, facilitating cooperation-based coopetition.