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contributor authorLindsay Hanna Landry
contributor authorJonathan Cagan
date accessioned2017-05-09T00:45:50Z
date available2017-05-09T00:45:50Z
date copyrightJune, 2011
date issued2011
identifier issn1050-0472
identifier otherJMDEDB-27948#061005_1.pdf
identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/147046
description abstractCooperation and reward of strategic agents in an evolutionary optimization framework is explored in order to better solve engineering design problems. Agents in this Evolutionary Multi-Agent Systems (EMAS) framework rely on one another to better their performance, but also vie for the opportunity to reproduce. The level of cooperation and reward is varied by altering the amount of interaction between agents and the fitness function describing their evolution. The effect of each variable is measured using the problem objective function as a metric. Increasing the amount of cooperation in the evolving team is shown to lead to improved performance for several multimodal and complex numerical optimization and three-dimensional layout problems. However, fitness functions that utilize team-based rewards are found to be inferior to those that reward on an individual basis. The performance trends for different fitness functions and levels of cooperation remain when EMAS is applied to the more complex problem of three-dimensional packing as well.
publisherThe American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
titleSearch Strategies in Evolutionary Multi-Agent Systems: The Effect of Cooperation and Reward on Solution Quality
typeJournal Paper
journal volume133
journal issue6
journal titleJournal of Mechanical Design
identifier doi10.1115/1.4004192
journal fristpage61005
identifier eissn1528-9001
keywordsPacking (Shipments)
keywordsAlgorithms
keywordsOptimization
keywordsMulti-agent systems
keywordsTeams
keywordsFunctions
keywordsDesign AND Engineering standards
treeJournal of Mechanical Design:;2011:;volume( 133 ):;issue: 006
contenttypeFulltext


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