Role of Opportunism and Trust in Construction Projects: Empirical Evidence from China

Abstract

Project success is the ultimate goal for all projects, and doubts often arise about what actually determines project success. On the basis of the transaction cost exchange (TCE) and relational exchange theory (RET), this study proposes that opportunism and trust coexist and work together to affect project success. External uncertainty, complexity, and cooperation duration are the variables that are considered in the specific construction context. Using primary data collected from 225 owners, contractors, designers, and supervisors in China’s construction industry, the empirical analysis shows that the negative opportunism and the positive trust counteract each other and affect the project success. Their relationships are influenced by the level of external uncertainty, but not by the level of complexity. In particular, the results also demonstrate that opportunism affects project performance through a mediating process, and the effects of opportunism and trust differ under varying cooperation durations. Based on a more comprehensive model, this study empirically addresses the importance of the two mechanisms of restraining opportunism and developing trust in the construction industry.