Conflicts and Cooperation in Brownfield Redevelopment Projects: Application of Conjoint Analysis and Game Theory to Model Strategic Decision Making

Abstract

Redevelopment of brownfields is placed high on the political agendas in many countries. However, brownfield redevelopment projects are often problematic, and the frequent occurrence of conflicts between involved and interdependent stakeholders is directly related. To date, there is no insight in the underlying interaction structure of brownfield redevelopment projects and tools are lacking to support the complex decision making between stakeholders. The aim of this article is to theoretically analyze the underlying interaction structures in brownfield redevelopment projects, modeling the process as an interdependent situation and applying game theoretical arguments. The explicit interaction between involved stakeholders is modeled as an interdependent process, using an approach in which conjoint analysis and game theory are combined. Our results show that there is one major source of conflicts—stakeholders choosing not to cooperate based on the presented game-setting. Other possible sources of conflict, such as difficulties in reaching a stable outcome or incomprehensibility of the game-setting, proved to have a limited contribution to the occurrence of conflicts. A more in-depth analysis of game-settings ending up in mutual cooperation showed that the appraisal of both stakeholders for the proposed development plan is the most influential factor, together with an eventual absolute difference between both players’ appraisals. Furthermore, stakeholders having a relatively weak power position within projects tend to prefer a noncooperative attitude and having some change can be beneficial for achieving mutual cooperation. If stakeholders have the prospect of achieving extra value through mutual plan optimization, they tend to be more willing to act cooperatively.