| description abstract | In the spring of 1980, the writer became project manager of the Israeli Air Base Program. This called for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to build, from scratch, high performance tactical fighter bases at Ramon and Ovda in the Negev Desert to replace two similar bases nearby in the Sinai Peninsula. The project, being carried out in agreement with the Camp David Accord, presented complex and unusual management challenges and brought with it an extraordinary amount of stress and strain. To begin with, Israelis and Americans shared in the management. The U.S. Air Force managed the program, orchestrating and ensuring activation of the two bases. An Israeli program management office also participated. The United States Corps of Engineers was construction agent for the program. Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai depended on the timely completion of the two air bases. The bases themselves were unlike American military airfields, and resembled more land‐based aircraft carriers, with underground hardened hangar complexes connected to multiple runways by high‐speed taxiways. Construction management was not routine. Separate U.S. design‐construct joint ventures carried out the work on each of the two air bases. The contractors, under a cost‐plus‐a‐fixed‐fee contract, were responsible for quality control, while the Corps of Engineers was responsible for quality assurance. Despite management problems, the two bases were built well, completed on time, and within budget. | |
