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dc.contributor.authorDavid C. Colony
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-08T21:18:48Z
dc.date.available2017-05-08T21:18:48Z
dc.date.copyrightApril 1983
dc.date.issued1983
dc.identifier.other%28asce%291052-3928%281983%29109%3A2%2885%29.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/46636
dc.description.abstractOf the various philosophical concepts considered, those presumably acceptable to a democratic society are utilitarianism and several notions which emphasize equity. Social welfare functions, which map individual preference orderings into a social choice, are examined for certain cases where such functions can be written explicitly. Benefit/cost ratio is one form of utilitarian social welfare function. Consequences to lower owners of upstream drainage developments are investigated, using game‐theoretic techniques and a definition of social power due to Harsanyi. Mathematical analysis indicates that the return period of the design flood and a parameter dependent on land use are “policy variables” requiring determination by a political process if utilitarianism is the social policy. If majority vote is the mechanism of determining social choice, a project design would be based on median value of expected flood damage. Assessment of each acre a uniform amount seems to be justified by application of a theory of games of fair division, while an objective of “equal social power” results in a policy of storm water retention for zero increase in runoff.
dc.publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
dc.titleEfficiency, Equity, and Drainage Design
dc.typeJournal Paper
dc.journal.volume109
dc.journal.issue2
dc.journal.titleJournal of Professional Issues in Engineering
dc.identifier.doi10.1061/(ASCE)1052-3928(1983)109:2(85)
dc.treeJournal of Professional Issues in Engineering:;1983:;Volume ( 109 ):;issue: 002
dc.contenttypeFulltext


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