Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Opportunistic Behaviors in PPP Projects Using Whole-Process Engineering Consulting

Abstract

Opportunistic behaviors are common in public–private partnership (PPP) projects. The contractor involvement in a whole project lifecycle is essential to ensure successful project planning, delivery, and operation, namely, through whole-process engineering consulting. Grounded with prospect theory, this study developed a tripartite evolutionary model among government, social capital, and whole-process engineering consulting enterprise for their opportunistic behavior in the delivery process of PPP projects. The model analyzed the risk attitude and loss avoidance of game subjects for strategic decision-making. MATLAB simulation was employed to validate the model. The results show that the risk attitude coefficient and loss aversion coefficient significantly affect the strategy choices of game subjects including reputation loss. The stability of the PPP project regulation system depends on several factors, including the severity of government punishment, the cost of rent-seeking, and the frequency of regulatory failure. The findings contribute to the current literature of risk assessment in PPP projects as well as the development and practice of whole-process engineering consulting in PPP projects.