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dc.contributor.authorYaron Hollander
dc.contributor.authorJoseph N. Prashker
dc.contributor.authorDavid Mahalel
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-08T21:05:48Z
dc.date.available2017-05-08T21:05:48Z
dc.date.copyrightMarch 2006
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.other%28asce%290733-9488%282006%29132%3A1%2853%29.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/38499
dc.description.abstractThe problem of seeking an optimal parking policy is formulated here as a Stackelberg game between the government and the travelers. The government wishes to encourage transit ridership while keeping a strong urban center; unlike most existing tools that assist in determining parking policies, the proposed game includes an explicit quantitative formulation of the governmental objective. Each traveler wishes to gain a maximum utility from his choice of destination and transportation mode, and the choice distribution of all travelers is obtained by
dc.publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
dc.titleDetermining the Desired Amount of Parking Using Game Theory
dc.typeJournal Paper
dc.journal.volume132
dc.journal.issue1
dc.journal.titleJournal of Urban Planning and Development
dc.identifier.doi10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9488(2006)132:1(53)
dc.treeJournal of Urban Planning and Development:;2006:;Volume ( 132 ):;issue: 001
dc.contenttypeFulltext


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