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dc.contributor.authorErrol C. Noel
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-08T21:05:19Z
dc.date.available2017-05-08T21:05:19Z
dc.date.copyrightMay 1983
dc.date.issued1983
dc.identifier.other%28asce%290733-9488%281983%29109%3A1%2844%29.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/38185
dc.description.abstractPresented is a review and analysis of night delivery as a tool for managing vehicle traffic in high density central business districts of urban areas. Data were collected in Washington, D.C., Denver, Colorado, Atlanta, Georgia, and San Francisco, California. The analysis revealed that although night delivery is practiced by few businesses, and has been suggested by several researchers as a means of traffic management, the institutional restraint to its implementation is diverse, and is particularly strong among elected officials, the police, and labor unions. Much of this resistance is due to the vested interest of those groups, rather than to the potential value of night delivery. Its unknown effect on the re‐election of public officials, extra enforcement requirements, adherence to a strong tradition of day‐time delivery among the unions, and the negative perception of all night work among union leadership, are the key institutional restraints. However, a universally transferable night delivery model is not practical in U.S. cities because of the strong and diverse delivery traditions and idiosyncrasies among the institutions of labor, local government, and business.
dc.publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
dc.titleNight Delivery: Institutional Restraints
dc.typeJournal Paper
dc.journal.volume109
dc.journal.issue1
dc.journal.titleJournal of Urban Planning and Development
dc.identifier.doi10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9488(1983)109:1(44)
dc.treeJournal of Urban Planning and Development:;1983:;Volume ( 109 ):;issue: 001
dc.contenttypeFulltext


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