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contributor authorChen-Yu Chang
contributor authorYaming Qian
date accessioned2017-05-08T22:19:19Z
date available2017-05-08T22:19:19Z
date copyrightJune 2015
date issued2015
identifier other40955667.pdf
identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/77578
description abstractThe holdup problem plays a central role in explaining governance choices in general and project delivery system selection in particular. This problem arises because of the asymmetrical distribution of quasi-rents between two trading parties. To put this theoretical proposition to a direct test, this research first uses the Nash bargaining model to derive a hypothesis that links quasi-rent differences to the excess profit margin that the contractor can achieve in ex post negotiations, and then collates a data set of 62 change-order cases to enable the hypothesis to be tested econometrically. The corroboration of the hypothesis lends empirical support to the core argument used in the analysis of construction holdup problems. This finding brings to the foreground the significance of recognizing that change orders might be attributed to the owner’s strategic choice. Ignorance of this factor would bias the coefficient estimation in the empirical analysis of change orders.
publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
titleAn Econometric Analysis of Holdup Problems in Construction Projects
typeJournal Paper
journal volume141
journal issue6
journal titleJournal of Construction Engineering and Management
identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000957
treeJournal of Construction Engineering and Management:;2015:;Volume ( 141 ):;issue: 006
contenttypeFulltext


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