| description abstract | The engagement of construction firms in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained strategic importance in facilitating the long-lasting transformation of the construction industry, particularly in light of the proliferation of sustainable development goals (SDGs). While previous studies have acknowledged the influence of regulative and normative pressures on CSR engagement, the impact of mimetic pressures, namely peer effects, on a construction firm’s CSR engagement remains unexplored. In the diffusion of peer effects, limited information on CSR-related activities of peer firms hampers the observation and learning from each other, where the interconnections between firms through directors serving on multiple boards come into play as a valuable resource in presenting opportunities for mutual learning and knowledge sharing. Therefore, drawing on the neoinstitutional theory, this study seeks to address this research gap by conducting a multiple regression analysis using secondary data from 35 Chinese-listed construction firms between 2010 and 2020. Specifically, this study investigates how and to what extent peer effects shape a construction firm’s CSR engagement through board interlocking ties and examines the moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership concentration and board independence. The results reveal the positive and significant influence of peer effects on the CSR engagement of construction firms through board interlocking ties. Moreover, the findings demonstrate that both ownership concentration and board independence serve as positive moderators in the relationship between peer effects and CSR engagement. This study contributes to the expanding body of research on the environmental, social, and governance practices of construction firms and provides novel insights into the role of board interlocking ties in promoting CSR imitation in the context of construction industry transformation. The findings not only broaden the understanding of CSR imitation among construction firms but also provide practical guidance for aligning the governance mechanisms of construction firms. | |
