| description abstract | Blockchain, essentially a distributed and immutable database, has emerged as a potential solution to governance problems of accountability, transparency, and trust in the construction industry. In terms of construction quality management (CQM) applications, previous works mainly took a technical perspective, and little is known about the potential of blockchain-based governance for quality opportunism. Moreover, we have seen very few successful blockchain implementations in construction practices. Stakeholders meet the trade-off between potential benefits and risks in blockchain adoption decisions. Previous works mainly focused on barrier analysis, neglecting the dynamic interactions of stakeholders’ strategic behaviors on adopting blockchains. Against this backdrop, this research aims to systematically analyze blockchain impacts on CQM from a governance perspective and then investigate the owner and the main contractors’ strategic behaviors (e.g., adopting blockchains in CQM or not). The agency theory was used as the theoretical lens to examine how blockchain curbs contractors’ quality opportunistic behaviors as a governance mechanism. An evolutionary game theory model was developed to simulate adoption decision interactions between the owner and the main contractor. Finally, policy suggestions were highlighted for policymakers. This research could be one of the first studies examining blockchain potential to CQM from an opportunism governance perspective. Such discussions could inspire more discussions on blockchain-based governance and broaden researchers’ and practitioners’ understandings of blockchain impacts. The proposed policy suggestions from the equilibrium analysis could facilitate blockchain diffusion in the construction industry. | |
