Evolutionary Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies for Construction Stakeholders in Promoting the Adoption of Green Building Technology Innovation

Abstract

Adopting green technology innovation for buildings (GTIB) is an inherent and inevitable requirement for the building industry to realize green development. However, profit-driven construction developers often engage in opportunistic behavior and are reluctant to embrace GTIB, impeding the effective allocation of resources for innovative development in the market. Previous research has yet to extensively explore the decision-making behavior of construction industry stakeholders that drive GTIB. To explore the impact on critical stakeholders of developers adopting GTIB, this study develops an evolutionary game model involving developers, consumers, and the government, considering the role of developers’ opportunistic GTIB strategies and consumer pressure. Subsequently, this model elaborates on the stable operation path by enabling the analysis of the influence of critical factors and combined government regulation and the consumer pressure mechanism. The results show that improving the input–output ratios of green technology, reducing the incremental costs of green building, and setting a reasonable range of incentives are beneficial. Interestingly, reputation has only a limited influence. It is concluded that government action is needed to increase consumer participation. This study helps governments decide how opportunism can be best avoided in promoting the developers’ adoption of GTIB while providing theoretical support for designing an effective policy framework that combines government regulation and consumer pressure.