Long-Term Market Competition Analysis for Hydropower Stations using SSDP-Games

Abstract

With the development of the power market in China, the operation of hydropower stations will be changed significantly. In a competitive environment, each hydropower station or station group tries to improve its own net benefits, compared to maximizing a power grid-level objective with centralized scheduling. To analyze the impact of market reformation on hydropower operations, both noncooperative and cooperative sampling stochastic dynamic programing game (SSDP-game) models are proposed in this paper to obtain monthly operation policies under a competitive environment. The models are tested using data for the hydropower stations of Longtan, Xiaowan, and Goupitan and a hypothetical demand curve. The results show the potential increase in net benefits and potential energy loss of each station, along with the influential factors of the gaming approach. The seasonal regulation demands, typically addressed through firm power constraints, are better achieved through market competition, with 1.0%–5.0% energy losses at individual stations.