Single versus Multiple Prime Contracting

Abstract

Policies regarding public building construction affect the interests of taxpayers, construction authorities, general contractors, specialty contractors, and other stakeholders. At the state level, the debate as to the optimal form such policies should take has become an ongoing struggle among competing interests. This study presents a systematic analysis of the main issues regarding single versus multiple prime contracting with the purpose of providing objective data to illuminate the debate. A statistical analysis of project bids and final costs from a national sample of state construction projects reveals that public construction projects organized with multiple prime contracts tend to have 5% less direct costs than projects using a single prime contractor. Moreover, approximately 80% of these savings are attributable to lower bid costs for multiple prime projects. The results of this study are in agreement with theoretical bidding models and efficient risk allocation models. Theoretical bidding models suggest that, in the absence of disruptions, multiple prime projects should have lower direct costs than single prime jobs. Efficient cost allocation models suggest that when specialty contractors do not bear the risks associated with the single prime contracting method (e.g., bid shopping and payment delays) they are willing to lower their bids, and forego the premium they would normally charge in response to such risks, as seems to be the case in multiple prime jobs.