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contributor authorRajendra Kumar Kaushal
contributor authorArvind K. Nema
date accessioned2017-05-08T21:42:21Z
date available2017-05-08T21:42:21Z
date copyrightFebruary 2013
date issued2013
identifier other%28asce%29ee%2E1943-7870%2E0000626.pdf
identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/60060
description abstractComputer waste has emerged as a critical issue globally because of the growing quantity of waste and problems arising out of its toxic nature. In India, it is estimated that 480,000 t of electronic waste (e-waste) is generated annually. Computer waste includes plastics and metals that have a good potential for recycling; however, if not managed properly, the additives and chemicals in plastic waste and traces of heavy metals raise concern for human health and the environment. Efficient e-waste management will require a strategy that offers a win-win situation for all the involved stakeholders. This paper uses a game-theoretic approach for analyzing the strategies by identifying the equilibrium points for various scenarios that can help in deciding the incentives and penalties for deriving the self-propelling market-based mechanism for efficient management of e-waste. Results suggest that applying take-back schemes with some incentives to the consumers and penalty to those who do not follow the prescribed procedure for discarding e-waste could be very useful to discourage the land disposal of computer waste. Nash-equilibrium implies that the recycler would prefer to collect the computer waste directly from the consumer only if the incentive return to the consumer is less than 15% of the price of the computer, the recycling fee is less than 5% of the price of the computer, and the price of the recycled material is more than 15% of the price of the computer; otherwise collect it through the producer. Also, for the producer, it would be preferable to take an extra fee from the consumer for end-of-life management of the desktop computer as an advance recovery fee (apparent fee) only up to 4.0% of the cost of the computer. If the producer had to take an extra fee more than 4.0%, it should be taken as an extended producer responsibility fee (hidden fee combined in the cost) so that computer sales are not affected.
publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
titleStrategic Analysis of Computer Waste Management Options: Game-Theoretic Approach
typeJournal Paper
journal volume139
journal issue2
journal titleJournal of Environmental Engineering
identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)EE.1943-7870.0000618
treeJournal of Environmental Engineering:;2013:;Volume ( 139 ):;issue: 002
contenttypeFulltext


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