| contributor author | Matthew A. Rigdon | |
| contributor author | Reetabrata Mookherjee | |
| contributor author | Terry L. Friesz | |
| date accessioned | 2017-05-08T21:21:34Z | |
| date available | 2017-05-08T21:21:34Z | |
| date copyright | March 2009 | |
| date issued | 2009 | |
| identifier other | %28asce%291076-0342%282009%2915%3A1%283%29.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/48360 | |
| description abstract | This paper puts forth a dynamic, game theoretic model of oligopolistic competition in electric power markets. The purpose of this model is to allow one to quickly and efficiently test the effects of changes to the capacity of the underlying electric power network. Therefore, the game is formulated as a nonlinear complementarity problem, which may be solved very efficiently. Transmission of power on the underlying electric power network is represented by the widely accepted linearized DC flow approximation, allowing the substitution of power transmission distribution factors for Kirchoff’s energy balance and voltage laws. The model is tested on a 15 node representation of the northwest European electricity market formed by Belgium, France, Germany, and The Netherlands. Numerical examples involving disruptions to both transmission and generation capacity are considered and the Braess paradox is observed. | |
| publisher | American Society of Civil Engineers | |
| title | Multiperiod Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions | |
| type | Journal Paper | |
| journal volume | 15 | |
| journal issue | 1 | |
| journal title | Journal of Infrastructure Systems | |
| identifier doi | 10.1061/(ASCE)1076-0342(2009)15:1(3) | |
| tree | Journal of Infrastructure Systems:;2009:;Volume ( 015 ):;issue: 001 | |
| contenttype | Fulltext | |
