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contributor authorSu Yi;Lucko Gunnar;Thompson Richard C.
date accessioned2019-02-26T07:55:17Z
date available2019-02-26T07:55:17Z
date issued2018
identifier other%28ASCE%29CO.1943-7862.0001410.pdf
identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4250288
description abstractA longstanding contentious question in construction scheduling is who owns float: the owner or general contractor. Float is the ability of scheduled activities to absorb delays by their flexible timing. Zero float is considered to constitute criticality. This definition creates a fundamental but largely ignored paradox: To mitigate risk, critical activities urgently need float, but by definition are given none. Yet consuming float can reduce local delays to prevent a ripple effect of negative consequences. This research revisits the float ownership problem with inspiration from voting theory, which can provide proven approaches that apportion a limited valuable good among several participants of different sizes. Equivalent concepts in voting and scheduling were extracted and aligned to derive a functioning approach. Performance of such float apportionment was visualized and quantified by how efficiently the new method protects against delays, both in terms of counts and periods, and when saturation occurs. It was validated by simulating all combinations of a substantial benchmark schedule. The initial question was thus revised to who should use float to minimize overall risk.
publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
titleApplication of Voting Theory to the Float Ownership Problem
typeJournal Paper
journal volume144
journal issue1
journal titleJournal of Construction Engineering and Management
identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001410
page4017094
treeJournal of Construction Engineering and Management:;2018:;Volume ( 144 ):;issue: 001
contenttypeFulltext


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