Game Theory–Based Analysis of Decision Making for Coastal Adaptation under Multilateral Participation

Abstract

Climate change has a different impact on each member of society. To reduce the damage caused by climate change, adaptation activities are being initiated, such as expanding the capacity of social infrastructures, and each stakeholder wants these adaptations to work in his or her favor. Therefore, a methodology is needed to determine adaptation measures that are most beneficial to all members of society. In this paper, a framework is proposed for producing an adaptation strategy that minimizes conflict between stakeholders. This framework casts the process of organizing climate change adaptations as a game and defines each community member as a stakeholder, each adaptation measure as a strategy, and the minimization of loss from future climate change as a payoff. In a case study involving sea level rise in Suncheon Bay, Korea, this framework is used to generate an optimal plan for minimizing conflicts while considering the losses of the central government, local governments, and local communities. The game theoretic results from the proposed framework enable a balanced distribution of responsibilities among stakeholders to achieve infrastructure adaptation to climate change.