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contributor authorContreras Carlos;Angulo Julio
date accessioned2019-02-26T07:45:31Z
date available2019-02-26T07:45:31Z
date issued2018
identifier other%28ASCE%29IS.1943-555X.0000425.pdf
identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/4249139
description abstractA widespread practice used in concession-based public private–partnerships (PPPs) arrangements consists of granting the concessionaire the right, under certain circumstances, to extend the concession term under a build-operate-finance-transfer (BOFT) arrangement. The asset involved in the project becomes the property of the government on its transfer. Thus, extending the concession period means an opportunity cost for the host government. By using an option-pricing model, this paper proposes a methodology for valuing the impact on the public budget arising from this option. This method can be of use in different transportation infrastructure projects, such as motorways, tunnels, and bridges. A case study is provided to show how the proposed methodology can be applied. The results confirm that the opportunity cost for the government may be high, and the main drivers behind this cost are the extension period, the base interest rates, and the risk premium of the government.
publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
titleGovernment Cost of Extending Concession Term Rights
typeJournal Paper
journal volume24
journal issue3
journal titleJournal of Infrastructure Systems
identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000425
page4018011
treeJournal of Infrastructure Systems:;2018:;Volume ( 024 ):;issue: 003
contenttypeFulltext


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