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    Contractual Incentives

    Source: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management:;1984:;Volume ( 110 ):;issue: 001
    Author:
    George Stukhart
    DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(1984)110:1(34)
    Publisher: American Society of Civil Engineers
    Abstract: Contract incentives are the means by which an owner intends to secure certain project goals through the contracting process. Incentive contracting is designed primarily to reduce cost in negotiated contracts through profit sharing ratios, which should improve on the efficiency of cost reimbursable contracts. In the process, financial risk and control are shared by the owner and contractor, according to a ratio which is established in the early stages of project design. Contractual incentives are used frequently in construction to reduce overall project time. However, there is a lack of published research on the theory and consequences of the use of incentives in construction. Studies in government research and development contracts using incentives shows that contractors may not always behave in the fashion intended by owners designing such contracts. The apparent reason is that the risk a contractor assumes under conditions of limited scope and design information biases the setting of targets, so that overruns/underruns are more dependent on where targets are set, rather than on sharing ratios. In the construction industry this is apparently recognized, and targets are not fixed until design is approximately 40%–60% complete. Moreover, as the contractor and owner attain more knowledge of the project, both parties should attempt to reduce owner risk and control.
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      Contractual Incentives

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    http://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl1/handle/yetl/74619
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    contributor authorGeorge Stukhart
    date accessioned2017-05-08T22:14:07Z
    date available2017-05-08T22:14:07Z
    date copyrightMarch 1984
    date issued1984
    identifier other%28asce%290733-9364%281984%29110%3A1%2834%29.pdf
    identifier urihttp://yetl.yabesh.ir/yetl/handle/yetl/74619
    description abstractContract incentives are the means by which an owner intends to secure certain project goals through the contracting process. Incentive contracting is designed primarily to reduce cost in negotiated contracts through profit sharing ratios, which should improve on the efficiency of cost reimbursable contracts. In the process, financial risk and control are shared by the owner and contractor, according to a ratio which is established in the early stages of project design. Contractual incentives are used frequently in construction to reduce overall project time. However, there is a lack of published research on the theory and consequences of the use of incentives in construction. Studies in government research and development contracts using incentives shows that contractors may not always behave in the fashion intended by owners designing such contracts. The apparent reason is that the risk a contractor assumes under conditions of limited scope and design information biases the setting of targets, so that overruns/underruns are more dependent on where targets are set, rather than on sharing ratios. In the construction industry this is apparently recognized, and targets are not fixed until design is approximately 40%–60% complete. Moreover, as the contractor and owner attain more knowledge of the project, both parties should attempt to reduce owner risk and control.
    publisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
    titleContractual Incentives
    typeJournal Paper
    journal volume110
    journal issue1
    journal titleJournal of Construction Engineering and Management
    identifier doi10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(1984)110:1(34)
    treeJournal of Construction Engineering and Management:;1984:;Volume ( 110 ):;issue: 001
    contenttypeFulltext
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